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Abstract 
Humans will incur costs to punish others who violate social norms. Theories of 
justice highlight two motives for punishment: a forward-looking deterrence of 
future norm violations, and a backward-looking retributive desire to harm. 
Previous studies of costly punishment have not isolated how much people are 
willing to pay for retribution alone, because typically punishment both inflicts 
damage (satisfying the retributive motive) and communicates a norm violation 
(satisfying the deterrence motive). Here, we isolated retributive motives by 
examining how much people will invest in punishment when the punished 
individual will never learn about the punishment. Such ‘hidden’ punishment 
cannot deter future norm violations, but was nevertheless frequently used by 
both second-party victims and third-party observers of norm violations, 
indicating that retributive motives drive punishment decisions independently 
from deterrence goals. While self-reports of deterrence motives correlated 
with deterrence-related punishment behavior, self-reports of retributive 
motives did not correlate with retributive punishment behavior. Our findings 
reveal a preference for pure retribution that can lead to punishment without 
any social benefits. 
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 Punishment of social norm violations is widespread across human 
societies (Henrich et al., 2006). Under certain conditions, punishment can 
prevent free-riding and promote cooperation, and many people are willing to 
‘altruistically’ punish anonymous strangers, even when it is costly and yields 
no material or reputational benefits (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003). Yet the 
motivational basis of costly altruistic punishment is not fully understood. 
Theories of justice highlight two major proximate motives for punishment: 
deterrence and retribution (Bentham, 1970; Kant, 1965). People motivated by 
deterrence employ punishment to prevent norm violators from repeating their 
bad behavior in the future; the goal of punishment is to teach a lesson by 
communicating that a norm has been violated. In contrast, people motivated 
by retribution employ punishment to cause norm violators to suffer; the goal of 
punishment is to inflict damage. Although these motives are separate in 
principle, they are intertwined in practice: any punishment that is 
communicated to the punisher satisfies both deterrence and retribution goals 
because it communicates a norm violation and the existence of people who 
are willing to punish (both of which may reduce future norm violations); and it 
inflicts damage to the norm violator (satisfying the retributive goal). 
 Understanding the extent to which punishment is driven by retributive 
motives has potentially important implications for the design of public 
institutions to promote social norms. If individuals derive private satisfaction 
from punishment irrespective of its ability to deter future harms, they may 
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utilize punishment inefficiently in terms of promoting social welfare by, for 
instance, persisting in punishment even in cases where its future benefits are 
limited. 
 Previous studies of punishment motives are consistent with the view 
that people are concerned about both deterrence and retribution. When asked 
to provide justifications for punishment, people frequently report a motivation 
to deter future crimes (Ellsworth & Ross, 1983; Vidmar & Miller, 1979). In 
hypothetical scenarios, punishment decisions are more sensitive to factors 
that are primarily associated with retribution (e.g., the severity of the crime) 
than to factors associated with deterrence (e.g., the likelihood of future 
transgressions) (Carlsmith, 2006; Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002). This 
work provides evidence that both retribution and deterrence motives may play 
a role in punishment decisions, but based on these studies it remains unclear 
to what extent people are willing to invest their own resources in punishment 
that fulfills retribution vs. deterrence goals. 
More recent studies of costly punishment have demonstrated that 
people are indeed willing to sacrifice personal payoffs in order to reduce the 
payoffs of norm violators (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003). However, these studies 
have not disentangled the communication of norms and the infliction of 
damage. It therefore remains unknown to what extent humans will invest their 
own resources to deter future norm violations versus to exact retribution. In 
other words, behavioral evidence for costly pure retribution in humans is 
lacking: it is not known whether individuals are willing to bear the cost of 
purely retributive sanctions. There is some evidence hinting that people may 
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be willing to pay for retribution alone; punishment levels are substantial even 
when the implementation of punishment is delayed until after all interaction is 
over (Fudenberg & Pathak, 2010), and in one-shot games when there is no 
opportunity for future interactions in the laboratory (Fehr & Fischbacher, 
2003). However, the potential effects of punishment on future behavior may 
well extend beyond the specific context of the laboratory: subjects who are 
informed that they are punished for a norm violation in a lab experiment may 
reduce future norm violations in similar situations outside the lab. Finally, 
neuroimaging studies have demonstrated activity in reward circuitry, including 
the striatum and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), during punishment of norm 
violators (Crockett et al., 2013; de Quervain et al., 2004), consistent with the 
notion that humans derive pleasure from punishment. But since the striatum 
and mPFC are known to be involved in anticipating distant rewarding 
outcomes (Kable & Glimcher, 2007), as well as encoding immediately 
rewarding outcomes (Haber & Knutson, 2009), these studies cannot rule out 
the possibility that punishment-related responses in these regions reflect the 
expected social benefits of deterring future norm violations. Moreover, striatal 
responses during punishment do not necessarily indicate feelings of pleasure 
(Poldrack, 2006), as the striatum is sometimes also involved in processing 
aversive outcomes (Delgado, Li, Schiller, & Phelps, 2008). 
 An additional question concerns differences in punishment motives 
between second parties who are affected by the norm violation and 
unaffected third parties. Empirical evidence shows that second parties punish 
more strongly than unaffected third parties (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004), and 
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the prevalence of third-party norm enforcement institutions such as juries 
concords with the common notion that third parties ought to punish in a more 
impartial or normative manner (Hirsch, 1986; Tunick, 1992). However, the 
extent to which retributive motives differ between second- and third-party 
punishment remains unclear. Comparing second- and third-party punishment 
is not straightforward, however. Previous attempts suffer from an obvious 
confound: in second-party punishment only two players are involved, whereas 
in third-party punishment three players are involved. This is potentially 
problematic because punishment decisions are sensitive to the presence of 
an audience (Kurzban, DeScioli, & O'Brien, 2007; Piazza & Bering, 2008). We 
addressed this issue by examining both second- and third- party punishment 
in a three-player setting. Our goal in the current study was to characterize the 
extent of proximate motives for retribution and deterrence in second- and 
third-party punishment. 
 
Participants 
Two hundred and fifty-nine healthy volunteers provided informed consent and 
participated in the study that was approved by the ethics committee of the 
Department of Economics, University of Zürich. One hundred and eleven 
healthy male volunteers (mean age: 23.2 y) participated in the role of player 
P, whose behavior was the main focus of the current study. These 
participants attended testing sessions in the Economics Laboratory at the 
University of Zürich, for which they received a participation fee of CHF 25, 
plus an additional payment based on their decisions in the study.  
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Method 
Three-player trust game with punishment 
 In our basic setting, three players (a punisher, P; a bystander, B; and a 
trustee, T) interact anonymously with each other. The punisher (P) and the 
bystander (B) each receive an endowment of CHF 5. The game has three 
stages. In the trust stage, P and B can entrust their endowment to T. Each 
entrusted endowment is multiplied by a multiplier m and transferred to T. 
Trustees were instructed that the multiplier could be any integer value 
between 2 and 6. 
 In the back-transfer stage, T decides what proportion (0%, 25%, or 
50%) of the received endowment (CHF 5 * m) to send back to one of the 
players, either P (second-party punishment, Fig. 1a) or B (third-party 
punishment, Fig. 1b). For the remaining player, the computer decides T’s 
back-transfer. Thus, in the second-party punishment condition, T decides how 
to repay P’s trust, while the computer determines how T repays B’s trust. In 
the third-party punishment condition, T decides how to repay B’s trust, while 
the computer determines how T repays P’s trust. 
 Finally in the punishment stage, P receives an additional endowment of 
CHF 5 and is able to spend up to his entire endowment to reduce T's payoff; 
each CHF 0.10 spent by P resulted in a payoff reduction of CHF 0.20 for T 
(see SOM for details). 
 In sequential trust and social dilemma games, a strong norm of 
conditional cooperation applies (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; 2004). This norm 
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demands that T responds kindly to initial cooperative acts of P and B in the 
first stage. Intentional back-transfers of 0% in the second stage therefore 
unambiguously violate this norm. In the second party condition only P is the 
victim of such a norm violation, while in the third party condition only B is the 
victim. We therefore expected P to punish T for intentional back-transfers of 
0%, since these represent norm violations.  
 
 
Isolating retributive motives 
 We isolated retributive motives by tightly controlling T's knowledge of 
whether he has been punished across two key experimental conditions. 
Although T’s payoff is always reduced when P punishes him (and P knows 
this), whether T learns about the punishment varies across conditions. In the 
open punishment condition, T receives a written message informing him 
whether P has punished him. In the hidden punishment condition, T is not 
informed whether P has punished him. This was made explicit to the P 
players in the experimental instructions, and P players had to pass a 
comprehension quiz to demonstrate their understanding of this before they 
started the decision-making phase of the experiment.  
 We were able to control T’s knowledge about his punishment in several 
ways. T was not informed of the size of the total endowment that he received 
through P’s and B’s transfers, nor the size of the back-transfer determined by 
the random device. Moreover, because a specific final payoff in the technically 
possible payoff range could arise in many different ways, the final payoff also 
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provided no information about punishment (see SI for a detailed explanation).  
 We used detailed instructions to ensure that the punisher P was aware 
of the difference between open and hidden punishment when he made his 
punishment decisions. We confirmed this with a comprehension quiz (see 
SOM for details).  
 Our experimental design provides a stringent test for the existence of 
retributive motives in humans. The hidden punishment condition excludes the 
deterrence motive, because deterring future norm violations requires that the 
perpetrator knows that he has been punished. Thus, higher punishment of 
unfair back-transfers (relative to fair back-transfers) in the hidden condition 
reflects retributive motives, i.e., the private satisfaction derived from reducing 
the payoff of a norm violator. In contrast, higher punishment of unfair back-
transfers (relative to fair back-transfers) in the open condition reflects a 
combination of retribution and deterrence motives (Table 1). Because the 
open condition has the same retributive effects as the hidden condition, but 
with the added benefit of deterrence, we expected open punishment of unfair 
back-transfers to be both more likely and more substantial than hidden 
punishment of unfair back-transfers. And based on previous studies 
suggesting a potential role of retributive motives in punishment (Carlsmith, 
2006; Carlsmith et al., 2002), we expected to observe higher punishment of 
unfair back-transfers (relative to fair back-transfers) in the hidden condition, 
despite the fact that unambiguous behavioral evidence for pure retribution is 
currently lacking.  
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Controlling for payoff-based motives 
 Decisions to punish can also be motivated by inequality aversion (Fehr 
& Schmidt, 1999) or other types of payoff-based social preferences such as 
spite (Jensen, 2010). People who dislike inequality will punish others with 
higher payoffs, regardless of whether the target of punishment is not 
responsible for payoff allocations (Blount, 1995; Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 
2008). Likewise, spiteful subjects punish regardless of whether the trustee 
decided intentionally or whether a random device determined the back-
transfer (Table 1). To separately control for such motives, we implemented a 
“computer control” condition in which T’s back-transfer decisions vis à vis both 
P and B were unintentional (i.e., determined by the computer; Fig. 1c). In the 
computer control condition, punishers faced a set of decisions that were 
identical to the two experimental conditions in all respects aside from the 
intentionality of the trustee T (Fig. S1, SOM).  
 
General procedure 
 We collected the decisions of B and T players in advance (see SOM), 
so that we were able to face each player P with an identical set of games 
without using deception. Each punisher P played a series of 54 anonymous 
one-shot trust games with punishment, each with different individuals in the 
roles of B and T. Each player P faced the same set of 54 games, reflecting a 
factorial within-subjects design that crossed (a) level of T’s back-transfer (0%, 
25%, or 50%), (b) second- vs. third-party punishment, (c) whether punishment 
was open or hidden, and (d) whether T’s back-transfer was intentional or 
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unintentional (Figure S1). The dependent measure was the amount P spent 
on punishment in each game. Subjects had unlimited time to make their 
punishment decisions. Punishment decision data were analyzed in SPSS 18 
using the generalized estimating equations (GEE) procedure, which 
generates for each tested main effect and interaction a chi-square statistic, a 
95% confidence interval, and an associated p-value. We used an independent 
working correlation matrix given that participants played one-shot games and 
thus the correlation between repeated measurements should be low. For 
analysis of binary (yes/no) punishment decisions, we used a logistic link 
function, and for analysis of continuous punishment amounts we used a linear 
link function. Effect sizes were computed using Cohen’s d. 
Following the 54 games, participants completed a questionnaire 
concerning their motivations for punishment (see SI). Both the games and the 
questionnaire were implemented using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). At the end 
of the session, one of the 54 games was randomly selected for payment for 
each subject. Subjects in the role of P received their payments in cash 
immediately. Subjects in the roles of T and B whose decisions were 
implemented in the randomly selected game received their payments by post. 
If the randomly selected game was one with open punishment, the payment 
sent to T included a letter that revealed whether P punished T, and by how 
much.  
 
Results 
Retribution and deterrence in second-party punishment 
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 In second-party punishment trials, P decided whether and how much to 
punish T for intentionally sending back 0%, 25%, or 50% of the money to P. 
As expected, back-transfer level had a significant effect on second-party 
punishment (likelihood: χ2=16.781, p<0.001, d = 0.84; amount: χ2=19.663, 
p<0.001, d = 0.93); P was much more likely to punish, and spent more to 
punish, T when he sent back 0% of the money, relative to 25% and 50%. 
Critically, subjects distinguished between fair and unfair back-transfers in both 
the open condition (likelihood: χ2=24.907, p<0.001, d = 1.08; amount: 
χ2=21.673, p<0.001, d = 0.99; Fig. 2, striped red bars) and the hidden 
condition (likelihood: χ2=9.544, p=0.008, d = 0.61; amount: χ2=13.419, 
p=0.001, d = 0.74; Fig. 2, solid red bars). The latter result provides 
unambiguous evidence for second-party retributive motives in humans. 
Finally, in line with our predictions, open punishment was both more likely and 
more substantial than hidden punishment, particularly for 0% back-transfers 
(open*back-transfer interaction, likelihood: χ2=12.487, p=0.002, d = 0.71; 
amount: χ2=11.419, p=0.003, d = 0.68). These findings demonstrate that the 
preference to communicate norms through punishment also plays an 
important role for punishment decisions. 
 
Retribution and deterrence in third-party punishment 
 In third-party punishment trials, P decided whether and how much to 
punish T for intentionally sending back 0%, 25%, or 50% of the money 
entrusted to him by B. We found that participants were less likely to engage in 
third-party punishment than second-party punishment (χ2=15.501, p<0.001, d 
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= 0.81), and spent less on third-party punishment than second-party 
punishment (χ2=10.505, p=0.001, d = 0.65). Thus, third party punishment is 
less likely and less strong even when controlling for the number of players 
involved in the interaction. 
 To what extent did retribution motivate third-party punishment? Similar 
to second-party punishment, we observed a main effect of T’s back-transfer to 
B on P’s decisions to punish T (likelihood: χ2=16.049, p<0.001, d = 0.82; 
amount spent: χ2=12.856, p<0.001, d = 0.72). Again, subjects distinguished 
between fair and unfair back-transfers in both the open condition (likelihood: 
χ2=18.266, p<0.001, d = 0.89; amount: χ2=12.019, p=0.002, d = 0.70; Fig. 2, 
striped blue bars) and the hidden condition (likelihood: χ2=8.122, p=0.017, d = 
0.56; amount: χ2=5.909, p=0.052, d = 0.47; Fig. 2, solid blue bars), providing 
evidence for third-party retributive motives. Finally, as was the case for 
second-party punishment, open punishment was both more likely and more 
substantial than hidden punishment, across all levels of back-transfer (main 
effect of open, likelihood: χ2=5.542, p=0.019, d = 0.46; amount: χ2=10.915, 
p=0.002, d = 0.66). The effect of norm communication on punishment of unfair 
back-transfers was no larger for third-party punishment than for second-party 
punishment (party*open*back-transfer interaction, likelihood: χ2=0.613, 
p=0.736; amount: χ2=2.211, p=0.331). 
 
Controlling for payoff-based motives  
 One potential alternative explanation for the observation of hidden 
punishment is that such punishment reflects inequality aversion, spite or other 
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types of purely payoff-based social preferences rather than retributive 
motives. Note that retributive motives can only play a role when back-
transfers are intentional while the punisher’s payoff-based social preferences 
might play a role in the punishment of both intentional and unintentional back-
transfers. Therefore, we can rule out these alternative explanations by 
comparing hidden punishment of intentional back-transfers by T with hidden 
punishment of unintentional back-transfers by T (matched for amount). In 
computer control trials (Fig. 1c), the computer decided player T’s back-
transfers to both P and B; therefore, in these trials, player T was not 
responsible for the level of back-transfer. Thus, the observation of higher 
punishment in the hidden-intentional condition, relative to the hidden-
unintentional condition, constitutes evidence for retributive motives over and 
above purely payoff-based social preferences.  
 We observed significantly more punishment in the hidden-intentional 
condition, relative to the hidden-unintentional condition. For second-party 
hidden punishment, there was a significant main effect of intentionality on 
punishment (likelihood: χ2=9.875, p=0.002, d = 0.62; amount: χ2=10.125, 
p=0.001, d = 0.63; Fig. 3, red bars); intentional back-transfers were punished 
more strongly than unintentional ones of equal value. This effect of 
intentionality was strongest for 0% back-transfers, as evidenced by a 
significant interaction between intentionality and back-transfer (likelihood: 
χ2=7.217, p=0.027, d = 0.53; amount: χ2=9.525, p=0.009, d = 0.61). For third-
party hidden punishment, there was also a significant interaction between 
intentionality and back-transfer; intentional back-transfers were punished 
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more strongly than unintentional back-transfers, but only for the most unfair 
(0%) back-transfers (likelihood: χ2=6.950, p=0.031, d = 0.52; amount: 
χ2=6.732, p=0.035, d = 0.51; Fig. 3, blue bars). Thus, payoff-based motives 
could not completely explain hidden punishment in either second-or third-
party punishment. 
 We next examined differences in retributive motives between second- 
and third-party punishment, focusing exclusively on trials in the hidden 
condition. The average level of hidden punishment of unintentional 0% 
transfers did not differ significantly between second- and third-party conditions 
(χ2=1.736, p=0.188), suggesting that second- and third-party punishment 
were matched in terms of purely payoff-based social preferences. However, 
the average amount of hidden punishment of intentional 0% transfers was 
significantly greater in second- than third-party punishment (χ2=7.125, 
p=0.008, d = 0.52). This observation was confirmed by a significant two-way 
interaction between party and intentionality (χ2=4.558, p=0.033, d = 0.41) 
within the hidden condition; punishment in the hidden-intentional condition, 
relative to the hidden-unintentional condition, was greater in second-party 
than in third-party punishment. These results suggest that retributive motives, 
while present in both second- and third-party punishment, are stronger in the 
former than in the latter. 
 
Self-reported motives for retribution and deterrence 
 We next explored the correspondence between subjects' self-reported 
motives for punishment and their actual punishment behavior. After they had 
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made all their decisions, we asked subjects to indicate on a Likert scale the 
extent to which their punishment decisions were motivated by factors 
associated with deterrence, and factors associated with retribution (see SI for 
details of the factor analysis). Endorsement of retributive motives was low, 
with a mean rating of 1.75 (s.e.=0.13) on a 5-point scale. Endorsement of 
deterrence motives was significantly higher (mean=3.06, s.e.=0.20, 
t(110)=6.769, p<0.001, d=1.29). We then correlated subjects' self-reported 
ratings against their own behavior. Our behavioral measure of deterrence 
motives – the difference between amount spent on open relative to hidden 
punishment of unfair (0%) back-transfers – was positively correlated with self-
reported deterrence motives (r=0.417, p=0.004, d = 0.92). However, our 
behavioral measure of retributive motives—the amount spent on hidden 
punishment of intentional relative to unintentional unfair (0%) back-transfers—
was not significantly correlated with self-reported retributive motives (r=0.017, 
p=0.913). The relationship between self-report and behavior was stronger for 
deterrence motives than for retributive motives  (Z=1.96, p=0.05, d = 0.38). In 
fact, self-reported retributive motives did not significantly predict any aspect of 
punishment behavior (all p>0.687).  
  
Discussion 
 Our findings provide unambiguous behavioral evidence that people are 
willing to invest personal resources in pure retribution without the possibility of 
deterrence. We observed higher punishment of unfair back-transfers than fair 
back-transfers even in our hidden treatment where the norm-enforcing 
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properties of punishment were completely removed. Retributive punishment 
was evident in both second- and third-party punishment settings, and could 
not be completely explained by inequality aversion or other purely payoff-
based preferences such as spite. These results indicate that people value 
reducing the payoffs of norm violators, even in the absence of any potential 
future social benefits of punishment. 
 At the same time, our data suggest that punishers derive additional 
value from the opportunity to communicate norms. Costly punishment was 
both more likely and more substantial when the target of punishment would 
learn that he was punished, controlling for material damage. This finding is 
consistent with previous work showing that the opportunity to communicate 
norms (sometimes called ‘emotion expression’) can serve as a substitute for 
inflicting material damage (Xiao & Houser, 2005; Yamagishi et al., 2009).  
 Alternatively, it is possible that the communication of norms is driven to 
some extent by a retributive desire to inflict emotional damage (in addition to 
material damage). Some evidence suggests this is indeed the case. Dictators 
who anticipate receiving a written message from their recipient give 
significantly higher amounts than those who will not receive a message, 
indicating that non-material sanctions carry emotional weight (Ellingsen & 
Johannesson, 2008; Xiao & Houser, 2009). It is therefore possible that the 
present study underestimated the extent to which retributive motives drive 
costly punishment. 
 We provide a novel method for directly comparing second- and third-
party punishment within a single setting. Holding constant the number of 
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players involved in the interaction, the payoff of the punisher, and the relative 
payoffs between the punisher and the other players, we observed stronger 
second-party punishment than third-party punishment. Preferences for the 
communication of norms did not significantly differ between second- and third-
party punishment. However, retributive motives were stronger in second- than 
third-party punishment. This suggests that personal suffering amplifies the 
demand for retribution, but not the communication of norms.   
 Notably, subjects’ distinction between open and hidden punishment 
was strongest for the unfair back-transfers. We observed a few instances of  
‘antisocial’ punishment of fair 50% back-transfers (Herrmann et al., 2008; 
Gächter et al., 2009; Rand et al., 2010; Rand & Nowak, 2011); unlike 
punishment of unfair back-transfers, the amount of antisocial punishment did 
not differ between open and hidden conditions. This suggests that antisocial 
punishment is driven by a desire to inflict damage on fair players, rather than 
a desire to communicate a norm of non-cooperation. This hypothesis could be 
tested further using similar methods as in the present study, but in populations 
with higher occurrences of antisocial punishment (Herrman et al., 2008). 
 Our methods also enabled us to disentangle punishment motives within 
subjects. Previous research on costly punishment behavior has not explicitly 
separated preferences about material payoffs from preferences about the 
communication of norm violations, since the target of punishment was always 
informed that he has been punished. Here we were able to measure the 
relative contributions of both types of preferences to punishment behavior, 
and to compare behavioral preferences with self-reported motives. Such 
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comparisons can be valuable because people may lack insight into their own 
motives (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), or be reluctant to disclose motivations that 
are less socially desirable. Consistent with this view, in our study subjects 
rarely endorsed retributive motives in the self-report questionnaire. 
Meanwhile, subjects were more likely to endorse motives for deterrence, 
perhaps because such motives are more socially desirable. Self-reported 
motives for deterrence were significantly correlated with our behavioral 
measure of deterrence, but self-reported motives for retribution were not 
correlated with our behavioral measure of retribution, or indeed any aspect of 
punishment behavior. Further research is needed to understand the factors 
that moderate the correspondence between self-reported motives and 
behavior. 
 An intriguing open question is whether preferences for retribution 
versus deterrence depend on distinct neural systems. Punishment decisions 
engage brain regions involved in the computation of value, including the 
striatum and mPFC (Baumgartner et al., 2011; Crockett et al., 2013; de 
Quervain et al., 2004), but also regions involved in forward planning and goal-
directed decision-making, including the dorsolateral PFC (Baumgartner et al., 
2011; Buckholtz et al., 2008; Sanfey et al., 2003). While activity in the striatum 
tracks the amount of material damage inflicted by punishment (de Quervain et 
al., 2004), prefrontal regions may be sensitive to whether punishment is likely 
to deter future harms (Buckholtz et al., 2008, 2012). Environmental factors 
such as stress are known to disrupt prefrontal function (Robbins & Arnsten, 
2009), and may therefore alter the nature of punishment decisions. 
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Understanding the influence of the environment on punishment decisions has 
important implications for the criminal justice system (Danziger, Levav, & 
Avnaim-Pesso, 2011). 
 The National Council on Crime and Delinquency has declared that 
“sentencing should not be based on revenge and retribution” (Hirsch, 1986; 
Tunick, 1992). This view is consistent with our finding that retributive motives 
were less forceful in third-party punishment, relative to second-party 
punishment. However, our findings also cast some doubt on the notion that 
‘impartial observers’ are capable of meting out punishments in a normative 
manner immune to emotional influences; retributive motives still explained a 
substantial portion of third-party punishment. This is perhaps not so surprising 
in light of humans’ remarkable capacity for empathy. Observing harm to 
another engages similar brain regions as those that signal harm to the self 
(Singer et al., 2004). Thus, if the desire for retribution arises in response to 
self-directed harm, it may be similarly triggered by harms against others, to 
the extent that harms against others feel aversive (Batson, Kennedy, & Nord, 
2007). Since empathy is stronger for in-group members, retributive motives 
may play a stronger role in third-party punishment when the victim is an in-
group member (Lieberman & Linke, 2007). This insight has potential 
implications for determining the composition of juries.  
 Research in evolutionary game theory has examined how punishment 
might have evolved (Boyd, Gintis, Bowles, & Richerson, 2003; Rand, Armao 
IV, Nakamaru, & Ohtsuki, 2010). In most of these models, the effects of 
punishment operate by reducing the fitness of non-cooperators, thus making 
 20 
them less plentiful in subsequent generations, rather than by reforming the 
behavior of non-cooperators in the current generation. These models 
therefore assume that one key function of punishment is to make non-
cooperators worse off, which does not require their knowledge that they have 
been punished – akin to our Hidden punishment condition. Our finding that 
people are indeed willing to punish non-cooperators even when such 
punishment cannot serve a deterrent function thus lends psychological 
support to the punishment mechanism employed by evolutionary models. 
 Although costly punishment often has the effect of increasing 
cooperation (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Balliet et al., 2011), whether people 
punish ‘altruistically’ in a psychological sense, with the explicit goal of 
promoting cooperation, remains hotly debated (Guala, 2012; McCullough, 
Kurzban, & Tabak, 2012; Yamagishi, Horita, & Mifune, 2012). Our results offer 
some resolution to this debate. We show that punishers are motivated in large 
part by a genuine preference to reduce the payoffs of norm violators, even in 
the absence of opportunities to enforce norms. Such ‘hidden’ punishment 
cannot be considered ‘altruistic’ because it cannot produce any social 
benefits. At the same time, we provide evidence that punishers have 
preferences for norm enforcement, in that punishers are more likely to punish, 
and spend more on punishment, when norms can be communicated. This 
could reflect an altruistic motive to deter future norm violations, or may instead 
reflect a retributive desire to inflict emotional harm. Regardless, the 
substantial contribution of retributive motives to costly punishment suggests 
that informal peer sanctions may not be the most efficient means of promoting 
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cooperation. Humans possess psychological mechanisms that can lead to 
destructive behavior that is sub-optimal in terms of deterring future harms. 
Further research is needed to understand how such motives influence the 
decisions of judges and juries. 
 
Acknowledgements 
MC is supported by a Sir Henry Wellcome Postdoctoral Fellowship from the 
Wellcome Trust (WT092217MA). The research was supported by the Swiss 
National Center of Competence in the Affective Sciences and the European 
Research Commission for grant number 295642, FEP, the Foundations of 
Economic Preferences. 
 
References 
Balliet, D., Mulder, L., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2011).  Reward, punishment, 
and cooperation: A meta-analysis.  Psychological Bulletin, 137, 594-615. 
Batson, C. D., Kennedy, C. L., & Nord, L. A. (2007). Anger at unfairness: is it 
moral outrage? European Journal of …. 
Baumgartner, T., Knoch, D., Hotz, P., Eisenegger, C., & Fehr, E. (2011). 
Dorsolateral and ventromedial prefrontal cortex orchestrate normative 
choice. Nature Neuroscience, 14(11), 1468–1474. 
Bentham, J. (1970). The utilitarian theory of punishment. In J. Bentham, J. H. 
Burns, & H. L. A. Hart (Eds.), An Introduction to Principles of Morals and 
Legislation. London: Athlone. 
Blount, S. (1995). When Social Outcomes Aren′ t Fair: The Effect of Causal 
Attributions on Preferences. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 63(2), 131–144. 
Boyd, R., Gintis, H., Bowles, S., & Richerson, P. J. (2003). The evolution of 
altruistic punishment. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences,100(6), 3531-3535. 
Buckholtz, J. W., Asplund, C. L., Dux, P. E., Zald, D. H., Gore, J. C., Jones, O. 
D., & Marois, R. (2008). The neural correlates of third-party punishment. 
Neuron, 60(5), 930–940. 
Buckholtz, J., & al, E. (2012). The roots of modern justice: cognitive and 
neural foundations of social norms and their enforcement. Nature 
Neuroscience. 
 22 
Carlsmith, K. M. (2006). The roles of retribution and utility in determining 
punishment. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42(4), 437–451. 
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2005.06.007 
Carlsmith, K. M., Darley, J. M., & Robinson, P. H. (2002). Why do we punish?: 
Deterrence and just deserts as motives for punishment. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 83(2), 284. 
Crockett, M. J., Apergis-Schoute, A., Herrmann, B., Lieberman, M. D., Müller, 
U., Robbins, T. W., & Clark, L. (2013). Serotonin modulates striatal 
responses to fairness and retaliation in humans. The Journal of 
Neuroscience. 
Danziger, S., Levav, J., & Avnaim-Pesso, L. (2011). Extraneous factors in 
judicial decisions. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of 
the United States of America, 108(17), 6889–6892. 
doi:10.1073/pnas.1018033108/-/DCSupplemental/pnas.201018033SI.pdf 
de Quervain, D. J. F., Fischbacher, U., Treyer, V., Schellhammer, M., 
Schnyder, U., Buck, A., & Fehr, E. (2004). The neural basis of altruistic 
punishment. Science; Science. 
Delgado, M. R., Li, J., Schiller, D., & Phelps, E. A. (2008). The role of the 
striatum in aversive learning and aversive prediction errors. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 363(1511), 
3787–3800. doi:10.1098/rstb.2008.0161 
Ellsworth, P. C., & Ross, L. (1983). Public Opinion and Capital Punishment: A 
Close Examination of the Views of Abolitionists and Retentionists. Crime 
& Delinquency, 29(1), 116–169. doi:10.1177/001112878302900105 
Falk, A., Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2008). Testing theories of fairness—
Intentions matter. Games and Economic Behavior, 62(1), 287–303. 
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2003). The nature of human altruism. Nature, 
425(6960), 785–791. 
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2004). Third-party punishment and social norms. 
Evolution and Human Behavior, 25(2), 63–87. 
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition, and 
cooperation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
Fudenberg, D., & Pathak, P. A. (2010). Unobserved punishment supports 
cooperation. Journal of Public Economics, 94(1-2), 78–86. 
doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.10.007 
Gächter, S., & Herrmann, B. (2009). Reciprocity, culture and human 
cooperation: previous insights and a new cross-cultural 
experiment.Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological 
Sciences,364(1518), 791-806. 
Guala, F. (2012). Reciprocity: Weak or strong? What punishment experiments 
do (and do not) demonstrate. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 35(01), 1–
15. doi:10.1017/S0140525X11000069 
Haber, S. N., & Knutson, B. (2009). The Reward Circuit: Linking Primate 
Anatomy and Human Imaging. Neuropsychopharmacology, 35(1), 4–26. 
doi:10.1038/npp.2009.129 
Henrich, J., McElreath, R., Barr, A., Ensminger, J., Barrett, C., Bolyanatz, A., 
et al. (2006). Costly Punishment across Human Societies. Science, New 
Series, 312(5781), 1767–1770. 
 23 
Herrmann, B., Thöni, C., & Gächter, S. (2008). Antisocial punishment across 
societies. Science, 319(5868), 1362-1367. 
Hirsch, von, A. (1986). Doing Justice. Westford, Mass.: Northeastern 
University Press. 
Jensen, K. (2010). Punishment and spite, the dark side of cooperation. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 
365(1553), 2635–2650. doi:10.1111/j.1420-9101.2006.01258.x 
Kable, J. W., & Glimcher, P. W. (2007). The neural correlates of subjective 
value during intertemporal choice. Nature Neuroscience, 10(12), 1625–
1633. doi:10.1038/nn2007 
Kant, I. (1965). The Penal Law and the Law of Pardon. In J. Ladd (Trans.), 
The Metaphysical Elements of Justice. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. 
Kurzban, R., DESCIOLI, P., & OBRIEN, E. (2007). Audience effects on 
moralistic punishment☆. Evolution and Human Behavior, 28(2), 75–84. 
doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2006.06.001 
Lieberman, D., & Linke, L. (2007). The effect of social category on third party 
punishment. Evolutionary Psychology, 5(2), 289–305. 
McCullough, M. E., Kurzban, R., & Tabak, B. A. (2012). Cognitive systems for 
revenge and forgiveness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1–15. 
doi:10.1017/S0140525X11002160 
Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal 
reports on mental processes. Psychological Review, 84(3), 231. 
Piazza, J., & Bering, J. M. (2008). The effects of perceived anonymity on 
altruistic punishment. Evolutionary Psychology, 6(3), 487–501. 
Poldrack, R. A. (2006). Can cognitive processes be inferred from 
neuroimaging data? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10(2), 59–63. 
doi:10.1016/j.tics.2005.12.004 
Robbins, T. W., & Arnsten, A. F. T. (2009). The Neuropsychopharmacology of 
Fronto-Executive Function: Monoaminergic Modulation. Annual Review of 
Neuroscience, 32(1), 267–287. 
doi:10.1146/annurev.neuro.051508.135535 
Rand, D. G., & Nowak, M. A. (2011). The evolution of antisocial punishment in 
optional public goods games. Nature Communications, 2, 434. 
Rand, D. G., Armao IV, J. J., Nakamaru, M., & Ohtsuki, H. (2010). Anti-social 
punishment can prevent the co-evolution of punishment and 
cooperation.Journal of theoretical biology, 265(4), 624-632. 
Sanfey, A. G., Rilling, J. K., Aronson, J. A., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. 
(2003). The neural basis of economic decision-making in the ultimatum 
game. Science, 300(5626), 1755–1758. 
Singer, T., Seymour, B., O'Doherty, J., Kaube, H., Dolan, R. J., & Frith, C. D. 
(2004). Empathy for pain involves the affective but not sensory 
components of pain. Science, 303(5661), 1157–1162. 
Tunick, M. (1992). Punishment: Theory and Practice. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Vidmar, N., & Miller, D. T. (1979). Socialpsychological processes underlying 
attitudes toward legal punishment. Law & Soc'y Rev., 14, 565. 
Vlaev, I. (2012). How different are real and hypothetical decisions? 
Overestimation, contrast and assimilation in social interaction. Journal of 
 24 
Economic Psychology, 33(5), 963–972. doi:10.1016/j.joep.2012.05.005 
Xiao, E., & Houser, D. (2005). Emotion expression in human punishment 
behavior. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America, 102(20), 7398. 
Yamagishi, T., Horita, Y., & Mifune, N. (2012). Rejection of unfair offers in the 
ultimatum game is no evidence of strong reciprocity. Presented at the 
Proceedings of the …. doi:10.1073/pnas.1212126109/-/DCSupplemental 
Yamagishi, T., Horita, Y., Takagishi, H., Shinada, M., Tanida, S., & Cook, K. 
S. (2009). The private rejection of unfair offers and emotional 
commitment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the 
United States of America, 106(28), 11520–11523. 
  
 25 
Table and Figure Captions 
Table 1. Different punishment motives predict different patterns of 
punishment across experimental conditions. 
Punishment motive Prediction 
Deterrence Open Unfair > Fair 
Hidden Unfair = Fair 
Computer Unfair = Fair 
Retribution Open Unfair > Fair 
Hidden Unfair > Fair 
Computer Unfair = Fair 
Payoff-based (e.g., spite,    
inequality aversion) 
Open Unfair > Fair 
Hidden Unfair > Fair 
Computer Unfair > Fair 
 
 
Figure 1. Experimental design. Each trial consisted of three stages. In the 
trust stage, the punisher (P) and bystander (B) entrust their endowments to 
the trustee (T). In the back-transfer stage, P and B receive back-transfers 
from T. In the punishment stage, P decides whether to punish T. We varied 
the back-transfer mechanism across three experimental conditions. (A) In 
second-party punishment trials, T decides how much to send back to P, while 
the computer decides how much T sends back to B. Thus, P’s punishment 
decision concerns T’s intentional back-transfer towards P. (B) In third-party 
punishment trials, T decides how much to send back to B, while the computer 
decides how much T sends back to P. Thus, P’s punishment decision 
concerns T’s intentional back-transfer towards B. (C) In computer control 
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trials, the computer decides how much T sends back to both P and B. Thus, 
P’s punishment decision concerns only the payoff differences between 
players. 
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Figure 2. Retribution and deterrence in second- and third-party 
punishment. Punishment likelihoods (A) and mean amount spent (B) for 
second-party punishment (2PP; red) and third-party punishment (3PP; blue), 
in the open (lined) and hidden (solid) conditions. Error bars depict SEM. 
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Figure 3. Retribution and payoff-based motives in second- and third-
party punishment. Punishment likelihoods (A) and mean amount spent (B) 
for hidden punishment levels when back-transfers resulted from intentional 
decisions by trustees (solid) versus when back-transfers resulted from the 
computer’s decision (lined), in the second-party punishment (2PP; red) and 
third-party punishment (3PP; blue) conditions. Error bars depict SEM. 
 
 
 
 
